

THE UNITED STATES' ROLE IN COMBATING MILITANT ISLAM IN FRANCE

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THE UNITED STATES' ROLE IN COMBATING MILITANT ISLAM IN FRANCE

by

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ABSTRACT

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The terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001 opened American eyes to the magnitude of a long existing security threat to the United States and many of its allies around the world. Although there had been terrorist attacks on U.S. soil and its interests abroad, the United States' elements of national power had been brought to bear somewhat discretely prior to 9/11. Since then, the U.S. strategy has been codified into a long term approach of advancing effective democracy with four short term objectives of preventing terrorist attacks, denying weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, denying terrorist sanctuary and support, and denying terrorists bases for launching terror. The extensive efforts do not aggressively seek an important long term goal: denying Islamist demagogues access to their most precious near-term objective – the vulnerable population from which they seek to recruit. By pursuing this objective, in addition to the others, in a manner tailored to each of its global allies, the United States can strategically impact this fight. France, with its considerable, vulnerable Algerian population, is but one example of where this approach can be applied.

THE UNITED STATES' ROLE IN COMBATING MILITANT ISLAM IN FRANCE

The North Wind and the Sun disputed as to which was the most powerful, and agreed that he should be declared the victor who could first strip a wayfaring man of his clothes. The North Wind first tried his power and blew with all his might, but the keener his blasts, the closer the Traveler wrapped his cloak around him, until at last, resigning all hope of victory, the Wind called upon the Sun to see what he could do. The Sun suddenly shone out with all his warmth. The Traveler no sooner felt his genial rays than he took off one garment after another, and at last, fairly overcome with heat, undressed and bathed in a stream that lay in his path.¹

—Aesop Fable

The international effort to adequately address the fearsome scourge of radical Islamist thought took on an increased sense of urgency following the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. The magnitude of the attacks, subsequent attacks in Europe, and the realization that the seeds of Islamist ideology permeate societies throughout the globe all contribute to a desire for a comprehensive solution to the problem. The United States' strategy for combating terrorism endeavors to provide such a solution.

The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT), first published in 2003 and updated in 2006, provides the United States' framework for winning the War on Terror. In its overview, the NSCT defines the War on Terror as both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas. In fighting these battles "we fight our terrorist enemies on the battlefield, we promote freedom and human dignity as alternatives to the terrorists' perverse vision of oppression and totalitarian rule."² In approaching the fight in this manner, the strategy aims to break "old orthodoxies that once confined our counterterrorism efforts primarily to the criminal justice system."³ The expanded counterterrorism approach endeavors to apply all elements of national power and influence, specifically identifying diplomatic, financial, intelligence, military and law

enforcement actions. In doing so, the strategy is designed to “protect the Homeland and extend our defenses, disrupt terrorist operations, and deprive our enemies of what they need to operate and survive.”⁴

To accomplish its aim of destroying the al-Qaeda network and confronting the radical ideology that justifies violence, the NSCT espouses a long term strategic approach with specific short term elements. The “long term antidote to the ideology of terrorism” is to advance effective democracies. Such democracies, in addition to holding elections,

honor and uphold basic human rights, including freedom of religion, conscience, speech, assembly, association, and press. They are responsive to their citizens, submitting to the will of the people. Effective democracies exercise effective sovereignty and maintain order within their own borders, address causes of conflict peacefully, protect independent and impartial systems of justice, punish crime, embrace the rule of law, and resist corruption. Effective democracies also limit the reach of government, protecting the institutions of civil society. In effective democracies, freedom is indivisible. They are the long-term antidote to the ideology of terrorism today.⁵

In discussing the long term approach, the NSCT states that terrorism is not simply a by-product of poverty, hostility to U.S. policy in Iraq, Israeli-Palestinian issues, or a response to U.S. military efforts to prevent terror attacks. The NSCT postulates that terrorism springs from political alienation, grievances that can be blamed on others, subcultures of conspiracy and misinformation, and an ideology that justifies murder, and it concludes that “effective democracy provides a counter to each, diminishing the underlying conditions terrorists seek to exploit.”⁶

The NSCT does acknowledge that democracies are not immune from terrorism. It states that “in some democracies, some ethnic or religious groups are unable or unwilling to grasp the benefits of freedom otherwise available in the society. Such

groups can evidence the same alienation and despair that the transnational terrorists exploit in undemocratic states.”⁷ Acknowledging that this exploitable condition exists among second and third generation citizens, and accounts for the emergence of “homegrown” terrorists, the NSCT notes that the United States will “continue to guard against the emergence of homegrown terrorists within our Homeland as well.”⁸ What the NSCT does not do, however, is address the emergence of homegrown terrorists in democratic nations who are considered U.S. allies.

Recent events reinforce the idea that Europe’s Western nations are an important battleground in the war on terrorism. Beyond the 9/11 hijackers, who were based in Hamburg, Germany, many other terrorist plots have been either hatched or executed in Europe. Between April 1985 and July 2001, there were 11 major terrorist attacks or foiled plots in Western Europe. A number of the plotters were either long term residents or citizens of those European countries. Given their potential impact on the U.S. homeland, either directly via attack or indirectly through interdiction of American interests abroad, the European terrorist or potential terrorist should be of utmost importance to the U.S. overall counter terrorism strategy.

Europe’s Muslim populations are increasing in size. “Net migration into Europe from elsewhere is at record levels, at around 1.7 million arrivals a year...in the middle of the twentieth century, there were virtually no Muslims in Western Europe. At the turn of the twenty-first, there were between 15 and 17 million Muslims in Western Europe, including 5 million in France.”⁹ The Muslim populations of these countries often experience the “alienation and despair” that the NSCT identifies. In France, for example, this disenfranchisement can be codified in socio-economic terms. France’s

Muslim population experiences an “unemployment rate of 40 percent in urban areas, almost four times the national average.”¹⁰ There is no Muslim representation in France’s National Assembly,¹¹ and France’s North African Muslim population finds itself in segregated ghettos within which has occurred the “formation of a veritable counter-society with its own norms, its economy (what one calls the black economy), and even its own political system.”¹² Given this spectrum of conditions, there exists a disaffected population that is vulnerable to Islamist advances. The Brussels based think tank, International Crisis Group, opines that because Muslim immigrant groups are not participating in French politics, “political frustration is assuming a violent expression, taking the form of Jihadi Salafism and riots, and is feeding off precarious social conditions, in terms of employment, housing, social discrimination and the stigmatization of Islam.”¹³ This political frustration, and its potential terrorist recriminations should not only concern France, but the United States as well, because such recriminations may affect U.S. citizens.

This paper will focus on the Global War on Terror, and how the United States can enhance its current National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) by encouraging its allies to more aggressively pursue policies that drive a wedge between Islamist ideology and those whom it attempts to co-opt. The paper’s focus will be just a small part of Western Europe’s Muslim population, France’s Algerians. The U.S. strategic approach to France and its Algerian population, with appropriate modifications, can potentially be used for other Western European nations and their various Muslim populations.

This paper is divided into four sections. The first explains why the United States' National Strategy for Countering Terrorism was crafted with the clash of civilizations theory as its foundation. The section goes on to frame society's conflict as not simply a fight against terrorists, a war with Islamist ideology, or a clash of civilizations, but rather as a clash of systems. In doing so, it will offer a framework for understanding that within the systems that breed "alienation and despair" reside the vulnerable populations who are the center of gravity in the War on Terror. Radical Islamists look to this population for recruitment and operational sustainment. The second section explains why the U.S. National Strategy for Countering Terrorism's limited definition of the War on Terror results in limited objectives that do not adequately target the vulnerable populations that the jihadists seek to co-opt. The third section will examine France's Algerian population and identify why the current French socio-economic system makes them vulnerable to exploitation by Islamists. The fourth section will identify recommended measures to address France's systemic flaws and suggest means by which the United States can influence France to take steps to fix them. In doing so, an important element of both France's and the United States' security concerns can be addressed.

Theory Behind U.S. Strategy

When analyzing the NSCT, it is important to understand the theory from which it springs. In "The Roots of Muslim Rage," Bernard Lewis offered his analysis of why "so many Muslims deeply resent the West."¹⁴ The document chronicles the evolution of Muslim "civilization" from one whose "response to Western civilization was one of admiration and emulation," to one in which "this mood of admiration and emulation has, among many Muslims, given way to one of hostility and rejection." As the article draws

to a close, he concludes: "It should by now be clear that we are facing a mood and a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations -- the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both." He follows this memorable and powerful statement with the cautionary note that "It is crucially important that we on our side should not be provoked into an equally historic but also equally irrational reaction against that rival." The former statement, however, was the one most quoted in the discussion that followed.

In 1993, Samuel Huntington's "The Clash of Civilizations?" built on Lewis' ideas and it presented Huntington's hypothesis that in the post-Cold War world, the "principle conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of civilizations."¹⁵ He pared down Arnold Toynbee's original civilizations list to "seven or eight major civilizations...that are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition and, most important, religion." While the revival of religion "provides a basis for identity and commitment that transcends national boundaries and unites civilizations," in Huntington's model, Islam and Hinduism are the only religions that are also civilizations. Huntington's thesis asserts that the fault lines between civilizations serve as the "battle lines of the future," and he focuses on the longest standing fault line between Western and Islamic civilizations. In doing so, he predicts that "This centuries-old military interaction between the west and Islam is unlikely to decline. It could become more virulent."¹⁶

The United States' NSCT is rooted in clash of civilization theory, both in the beliefs of national leaders responsible for creating it, its chosen courses of action for combating terrorism, and in the manner in which it has been executed over the last nine years. Because the theory focuses on the "West versus Islam" fault line, the NSCT's 2003 version focuses on terrorists it associates with Islam. The 2003 document defines the enemy as "...not one person. It is not a single political regime. Certainly it is not a religion. The enemy is terrorism – premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents."¹⁷ While the document is careful to point out that "we will continue assuring Muslim values are not at odds with Islam," the document focuses on terrorism associated with Islam or Islamists. Whereas the Irish Republican Army is mentioned once, and FARC mentioned twice, al-Qaida is mentioned 13 times. This is understandable, given that al-Qaida executed the 9/11 attacks, but it nonetheless shows the document's focus.

The NSCT's foundation is clash of civilization theory, because the theory's architect was intimately involved in shaping the opinions of key administration officials. In January 2001, Bernard Lewis gave a briefing at the White House on Islam. During the speech, Lewis "posits that Muslims who distrust the U.S. are motivated not by its policies but by their innate hostility to Western values."¹⁸ On September 19th, 2001, Bernard Lewis spoke before the Defense Policy Board. With Board Chairman Richard Perle, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, and former House Speaker Newt Gingrich in attendance, he articulated his vision for the appropriate U.S. response to the 9/11 attacks.¹⁹ Later, Lewis, who had known Vice President Richard Cheney for 15

years, attended a dinner at the Vice President's residence. There, he conducted a "seminar on Islam, the Koran, and Muslim attitudes towards Americans."²⁰ Of Lewis, Vice President Cheney later said, "You simply cannot find a greater authority on Middle Eastern history, classical Islamic civilization, the Ottoman Empire...than this man."²¹ Dr. Lewis also participated in creating a report predicting a two-generation battle with radical Islamism. The report, published by the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) was hand delivered to President George W. Bush's administration. The report, AEI president Christopher DeMuth commented, "had a strong impact on Bush, causing him to focus on the 'malignancy' of the Middle East."²² Because those with the most philosophic influence within President Bush's administration saw the war in this manner, the policy was written and subsequently executed with a clash of civilizations mentality.

In the nine years that have passed since 9/11, the manner in which this conflict has been framed has guided the United States,' and in some ways the world's, approach to dealing with the contentious issues associated with its 1.57 billion Muslim population. In Europe, projections of non-white birth and immigration rates, combined with assumptions about immigrant loyalties, fuel fear. These factors combine to portend the inevitable "clash of civilizations" that Lewis and Huntington theorized. Due to the increasingly large Muslim demographic, Western civilization's demise seems possible.

This is not a new belief. In 1883, French philosopher Ernest Renan wrote: "In the early Middle Ages, Islam tolerated philosophy, because it could not stop it. It could not stop it because it was yet disorganized, and poorly armed for terror....But as soon as Islam had a mass ardent of believers at its disposal, it destroyed everything in its path."²³ Renan, described by some as a "French polymath," was an influential humanist

scholar whose progressive humanist philosophy was well known throughout Europe.

He was also, however, anti-religious, anti-semitic, and in modern terms a purveyor of racist ideology. Of Chinese and “Negroes” he wrote:

Nature has made a race of workers, the Chinese race, who have wonderful manual dexterity and almost no sense of honor...A race of tillers of the soil, the Negro; treat him with kindness and humanity, and all will be as it should; a race of masters and soldiers, the European race. Reduce this noble race to working in the ergastulum like Negros and Chinese, and they rebel... But the life at which our workers rebel would make a Chinese or a fellah happy, as they are not military creatures in the least. Let each one do what he is made for, and all will be well.²⁴

Given this view, it appears Renan’s perspective of “Islamic civilization,” was not without bias. Renan’s belief that Islam is a civilization that is at odds with Western civilization is, however, the foundation upon which many contemporary theorists base their interpretation of the modern war on terror. With this view as their foundation, it is somewhat understandable why some Muslims perceive the “war” against terror, the war against Islamist thought, and a war against Islam as all being the same thing. This view, if unchecked, will all but ensure the clash of civilizations that the world fears.

Characterizing this complex issue in terms of civilizations empowers Islamist demagogues.

Interviewer: What is your opinion about what is being said concerning your analogies and the “Clash of Civilizations”? Your constant use of the word ‘Crusade’ and ‘Crusader’ show that you uphold this saying, the ‘Clash of Civilizations’.

Osama bin Laden: I say there is no doubt about this. This is a very clear matter...²⁵

Political Islam (Islamism), used by radical factions to justify terrorist activities, has grown over the past 40 years. The three major movements, Wahabism, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Khomeinism, each promote a “jihadi” philosophy that is tailored to

audiences whose support depends on the palatability of the message. The lowest common denominator is the purported defense of the Islamic faith from perceived attackers. This tact plays on the fears of even moderate Muslims who look at historical Western interaction with the Islamic faith in terms of crusades, colonialism, exploitation for natural resources (oil), or support for Zionism. Associated with this rationale is the rejection of “Western” ideals. Islamists contend that the seemingly discrete introduction of Western ideals into Islamic society marginalize Islam. Only through the imposition of Sharia law, Islamists suggest, can Islam remain pure, and thus resistant to Western incursions. The pinnacle of “true believer” Islamist dogma is their ultimate “defense” concept, which is an offensive plan to restore a hegemonic Caliphate through any means necessary. The Egyptian Muslim scholar, best known for his Al Jazeera show “Shariah and Life,” Dr. Yusuf Al-Qaradawi seems to articulate this view in a semi-innocuous manner. “Islam will return to Europe. The conquest need not necessarily be by sword. Perhaps we will conquer these lands without armies. We want an army of preachers and teachers who will present Islam in all languages and all dialects.”²⁶

This graduated approach to recruitment and indoctrination, simple in its design, is the means by which so many have been drawn to the jihadi movement. For those acolytes of the clash of civilizations theory, it is sufficient means to justify a Global War on Terror that directly attacks Islamists, and indirectly attacks Islam, in order to achieve success. However, there is a growing number of analysts who see the central danger in accepting a clash of civilizations theory as the basis of analysis is the fact that *it* is the model that radical Islamists use to mobilize support. Gilles Kepel points out that Ayman al-Zawahiri’s text *Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner*, “presents a worldview

comparable – but in reverse – to Samuel Huntington’s famous clash of civilizations.”²⁷

In it al-Zawahiri opines that jihadi movements represent “a growing power that is rallying under the banner of jihad for the sake of God and operating outside the scope of the new world order. It is free of the servitude for the dominating western empire. It promises destruction and ruin for the new Crusades against the lands of Islam.”²⁸ If both non-Muslim and Muslim populations accept the clash of civilizations model, then the magnitude of the conflict may grow into a true cultural war, with potentially devastating results.

Rather than a clash of civilizations, this modern conflict may be better viewed as a clash of systems. It is a clash between an increasingly interactive and expanding social and economic system that emphasizes individual rights and one that rejects this system because its proponents do not feel that they have a role within an interactive society. This clash is more pronounced today due to the nature and magnitude of globalization.

Thomas Barnett describes today’s globalized world as one divided into distinct subsets. Within it, a functioning core of states have embraced the Western world’s system of globalization. These countries have stable governments, rising standards of living, liberal media, and are included in one or more systems of collective security. There are “Seam States” on the boundary of the functioning core which have only begun to integrate or have not yet fully integrated into the world system. Last are the world’s trouble spots, the “non-integrating gap,” which is resistant to the “Western” principles of rule of law and individual rights.²⁹ Some non-integrated countries in South America and Asia are states with marginal governance, extreme poverty, and

alternative economies such as narco-trafficking. Others, within the Middle East, have functioning (autocratic) governments and powerful economies that benefit a relatively small part of the population. In South America and Asia, disenfranchised youth are vulnerable to the lure of narco-criminal enterprise. In the Middle East, disenfranchised Muslim youth are vulnerable to jihadist overtures. Within the global environment, there are non-integrated communities within nations that are otherwise considered functioning core states. Muslims within these communities are also vulnerable to jihadist recruitment.

According to Barnett's theory, the non-integrating gap's citizens are now faced with the choice of either becoming a part of the global system or remaining "where the most critical battles in the wider clash of systems will occur."³⁰ It is important to acknowledge that populations exist, even within functioning core states, which are not convinced that they have a role to play within the global landscape. Whether Great Britain's Pakistani population, France's citizens of North African descent, or Germany's Turkish inhabitants, disenfranchised individuals are fertile ground for violent dissent. The U.S. and allied nations' primary goal must be to convince the undecided people of the world that becoming a part of the global system is a better option than fighting against it.

In the Middle East, this conflict pits moderates who seek to reconcile the Islamic culture, religion, and worldview with the socio-economic benefits spread by modern globalization, and those like Osama bin Laden, who espouse a system in which an Islamist theocracy seeks to deny individual rights. The Islamists' ability to attain their goal, like any politician, hinges on their ability to identify and convince potential

constituents that the evils of a globalized world warrant immediate militant action. They hope an “Islam is the answer” slogan will suffice when the non-committed populace asks for their plan for the aftermath of global jihad.

Limitations of U.S. Strategy

The NSCT, to this point, has failed to fully grasp this conflict’s nature, and has correspondingly utilized an approach that focuses on those who have already determined that personal investment in the global system is futile. Consequently, the NSCT has only partially affected the Islamist agenda.

The NSCT, updated in 2006, “sets the course for winning the War on Terror.”³¹ To accomplish this, the strategy endeavors to “confront the radical ideology that justifies the use of violence against innocents in the name of religion.”³² The NSCT defines an approach that includes advancing democracies as a long term antidote to the ideology of terrorism; preventing attacks by terrorist networks; denying weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to rogue states and terrorist allies who seek to use them; denying terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states; denying terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and launching pad for terror; and laying the foundations and building the institutions and structures needed to carry the fight forward against terror and help ensure ultimate success. The NSCT frames the problem by attempting to briefly define what “gives rise to terrorism.”

The NSCT’s long term approach for winning the War on Terror is advancing effective democracy. There are four factors, according to the NSCT, from which terrorism springs. The political alienation felt within populations with no voice in their government, and who see no legitimate way to promote change in their own country;


grievances that can be blamed on others and on perceived injustices from recent or sometimes distant past; terrorists recruit from subcultures of conspiracy and misinformation whose information about the world is contaminated by falsehoods and corrupted by conspiracy theories; terrorism ultimately depends upon the appeal of an ideology that justifies murder. Defeating terrorism in the long run requires that each of these factors be addressed, and the NSCT posits that because “democracy is the antithesis of terrorist tyranny...effective democracy provides a counter to each (of the factors), diminishing the underlying conditions terrorist seek to exploit.”³³ The United States’ long term solution to the problem of terrorism, according to the NSCT, is spreading effective democracy.

A more comprehensive analysis of why and how individuals become terrorists would have provided the NSCT’s framers with a broader context from which to base their long term approach. Different disciplines evaluate the question of radicalization and terrorism in different ways.³⁴ Psychological approaches examine individual factors that can include personality characteristics, mental illness, or previous exposure to traumatic experiences. Social psychology focuses on the motivating role of group dynamics and peer pressure. Models employing rational-choice paradigms evaluate the influential roles of preferences, rewards, and constraints on terrorist behavior. Sociological perspectives focus on patterns of social relationships, social interactions and culture. Political science approaches examine the over-arching role of political environments on individual behavior and often address such factors as occupation by a foreign power and the struggle for liberation. The study of religion seeks to understand the role of religious perspectives as a motivating force. The NSCT’s approach is not

clear, but analysis using a multidisciplinary approach results in many more than four factors that contribute to terrorism. Because “missing data points risk skewing study conclusions a comprehensive multi-discipline approach is imperative. When various disciplines are considered, a long list of radicalization factors result that can be divided into four headings: radicalizing social groups, desire for change, desire to respond to grievance, and perceived rewards.”³⁵

This process is articulated in the “Hypothesized Relationship Among Factors Implicated in Radicalization.”³⁶ According to this theory, there are any number of combinations that can result in an individual’s willingness to engage in terrorism. Applied to the subject of Islamist based terror, an individual’s transformation from disaffected Muslim to Islamist to Jihadist to terrorist is best interdicted as early in the process as possible. Psychologist Mark Sageman describes the social dynamics of conformity, compliance, group think, group polarization, diffusion of responsibility and in-group/out-group, as aspects that influence the radicalization process. As an example, he notes that some Middle Eastern Muslims in Europe become homesick and feel alienated in their host communities. Seeking companionship, they form small cliques that may radicalize should other contributing factors come to bear. Recruitment, sustained interaction with radicalized family members, the radical breeding ground of prison, and radical internet sites may provide the radicalization information that one or more clique members bring to the group. Some terrorist recruits may be motivated out of a desire for a change espoused by the group they seek to join. That change could be religious, political, or a single issue. A subset of individuals may also be motivated by a desire to respond to a perceived grievance inflicted upon the individual, family, or a

larger collective group with whom the individual closely identifies. The final factor, real or perceived rewards, includes excitement, financial, social (status), or religious (martyrdom) as potential motivations that contribute to radicalization. The table below articulates the Hypothesized Relationship Among Factors Implicated in Radicalization, showing that a combination of radicalizing social groups, real or perceived rewards, and either a need to respond to grievances or passion for change contribute to an individual's willingness to engage in terrorism. When applied to a Muslim, it lays out the contributing variables in the progression from one who follows Islam to one who believes in a politicized version of Islam (Islamist), to one who espouses jihad as a means to respond to grievances or change the environment from which the grievances are created, to an individual who is willing to commit an act of terror.



Given this construct, and that the “bountiful number of available recruits may enable these (terrorist) organizations to fill or even expand depleted ranks,” Rand Corporation behavioral scientist Todd Helmus stated, “Policies will need to consider approaches that limit the influx of new members. A counter-recruitment strategy may prove meaningful.”³⁸

In the HBO documentary “My trip to Al-Qaeda,” author Lawrence Wright discusses at length another variable which may contribute to an individual’s willingness to engage in terrorism. Based on his years of research while writing his Pulitzer Prize winning book, *The Looming Tower*, the documentary chronicles his research that began five months after 9/11. Wright feels that a fundamental characteristic of those most vulnerable is a feeling of humiliation. Whether real, perceived, contrived or simply a choice, the humiliated can find an advantage in seeing themselves as “victim of history.” Of the humiliated population’s temperament, he comments, “If you are powerless in your own society, the humiliated have a moral license to regain their dignity, they are entitled to hate...”³⁹ This not to say that this rationalization is justified, but rather, that the Islamists realize that it can be exploited.

Since 9/11, the NSCT focus on the long term approach of advancing democracy, and short term focus on preventing attacks by terrorist networks; denying WMD to rogue states and terrorist allies who seek to use them; denying terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states; denying terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and launching pad for terror; and laying the foundations and building the institutions and structures needed to carry the fight forward against terror and help ensure ultimate success failed to identify and address the need to actively engage the

conditions that give rise to “non-integrating gap” society. This society’s inhabitants are vulnerable to Islamist recruitment, and because they potentially provide future generations of terrorists, are the center of gravity in the War on Terror. Practitioners of future terrorist attacks continue to recruit, organize, and train participants from the Middle East and Europe while setting conditions for attacks in Europe, Asia, Africa, and the United States. The U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorist Networks, though far-reaching in its intent, fails to fully identify as a priority the need to deny Islamists the ability to co-opt the populations most vulnerable to their dogma. With its partnered nations in the Global War on Terror, the United States must coordinate this effort via proactive means.

If the context of the war is expanded as described, then either adding a second long term objective or changing the existing one is necessary. Precluding the creation of Islamist alliances and bonds in the European Muslim community requires a concerted effort to diminish the isolation experienced by the parallel Muslim societies that are prevalent throughout the continent.

France’s Algerian Population

An example of such a parallel society is France’s Algerian population. A look inside this specific demographic, its place in French society, and a multi-disciplined analysis of French Algerians using the Hypothesized Relationship Among Factors Implicated in Radicalization model, will help identify a specific approach to driving a wedge between the French Algerians and the Islamists who wish to exploit them.

To develop a comprehensive understanding of France’s Algerian immigrant population, one must understand more than the history of their stay in France. French

Algerian philosopher Abdelmalek Sayad stated that “any study of migratory phenomena that overlooks the emigrants’ conditions of origin is bound only to give a view that is at once partial and ethnocentric.”⁴⁰ Consequently, he proposes that the analyst must “investigate the differential processes that have brought them to their present situation, and their origins must be found outside their emigration.”⁴¹

French colonization of Algeria lasted from 1830 through 1962, pitting Algeria’s Muslim majority against the European immigrants who denied them political and economic status. Preceding colonization was conflict between Ottoman invaders and France due to Mediterranean Sea piracy. Following the French invasion in the 1830’s, occupied areas of Algeria were annexed as a colony. A land rush ensued, European farmers began to settle in the fertile lands adjacent to the Mediterranean Sea and exploit the inexpensive local labor force. During this period, Muslim natives were subjected to brutal repression. In a 1843 letter to a friend, Lieutenant Colonel de Montagnac wrote:

All populations which do not accept our conditions must be despoiled. Everything must be seized, devastated, without age or sex distinction: grass must not grow any more where the French army has put the foot. Who wants the end wants the means, whatever may say our philanthropists. I personally warn all good militaries which I have the honour to lead that if they happen to bring me a living Arab, they will receive a beating with the flat of the saber... This is how, my dear friend, we must do war against Arabs: kill all men over the age of fifteen, take all their women and children, load them onto naval vessels, send them to the Marquesas Islands or elsewhere. In one word, annihilate all that will not crawl beneath our feet like dogs.⁴²

A royal ordinance in 1845 called for three types of administration in Algeria. In areas where Europeans were a substantial part of the population, colonists elected mayors for fully self-governing communities (*communes de plein exercice*).⁴³ In “mixed communes,” where Muslims were a large majority, government consisted of appointed

and elected Muslim officials, some “great chieftains” (*grand chefs*), and a French administrator. Indigenous communities (*communes indigenes*), remote areas not sufficiently pacified, remained under the rule of the sword (*regime du sabre*), in which local Muslim administration was allowed under French military control. After the French Revolution of 1848, Algeria’s status as a colony ended and Algeria was declared an integral part of France. Muslims could not hold elective positions, but were rather appointed by French citizens. The native appointees could hold no more than one-third of council seats. Muslim appointees were assigned based on their loyalty to France and became known as yes-men (*beni-oui-ouis*). By 1871, increasing numbers of French colonists resulted in the forced removal of indigenous Algerians from their land and led to the first native insurrection of the French colonial period. Following the uprising, French authorities confiscated more than 500,000 hectares of tribal land and denied natives due process of French law under “extraordinary rule” (*regime d’exception*), in which natives could be jailed for up to five years without trial.

By 1915, only 50,000 of Algeria’s more than 4,000,000 Muslims could vote, and the bulk of Algeria’s wealth was controlled by the colonists. Muslims, who accounted for more than 90% of Algeria’s population and produced only 20 percent of Algeria’s income, paid 70 percent of direct taxes and 45 percent of total taxes collected. Fewer than five percent of Muslim children attended school, and they came only from *beni-oui-ouis* families, and were afforded no Arabic or Islamic studies. Because the colonists only maintained dialogue with the *beni-oui-ouis*, Muslim traditionalists and French loyalist natives formed separate societies.

Increasing native Algerian dissatisfaction resulted in the creation of political movements that espoused either integration or Algerian independence. Colonists rejected any movement towards reform, and by the 1930s “retained almost total control of Algerian administration and police.”⁴⁴ In 1936, the first Algerian Muslim Congress authored a Charter of Demands which called for the abolition of *regime d’exception* laws, and demanded political integration, a fusion of European and Muslim education systems, freedom to use Arabic in education and press, equal wages for equal work, land reform, and universal suffrage. A Muslim delegation presented the charter in Paris, and received a counter-plan that was far less extensive, and which was ultimately disapproved by the colonial administrators.

During World War II, after Algeria’s Vichy regime fell, the Free French commander called on the Muslim population to supply troops for the Allied war effort. Muslim leaders replied that Algerians were ready to fight with the Allies in freeing their homeland but demanded the right to call a conference of Muslim representatives to develop political, economic, and social institutions for the indigenous population “within an essentially French framework.”⁴⁵ Told that politics must wait until the end of the war, Muslim leaders still mustered an army of 250,000 men to fight in the Italian campaign. As Victory in Europe Day approached, nationalist leaders prepared demonstrations calling for liberation. Despite warnings from police not to march with nationalist flags or placards, they marched on May 8, 1945, and were met with gunfire. In the violence that followed, between 1,500 (French estimate) Muslims were killed. Other estimates varied from 6,000 killed to as high as 40,000. Although 5,460 Muslims were arrested in the aftermath, the French National Assembly subsequently approved the creation of an

Algerian assembly with one house representing Europeans and “Meritorious Muslims,” and the other representing the remaining Muslims. This plan was deemed insufficient by the Muslim majority and too audacious by the colonists. Disputed elections were held in 1948 and 1951, and the initiative’s failure resulted in the creation of the Revolutionary Committee of Unity and Action (*Comité Révolutionnaire d'Unité et d'Action* (CRUA). Between March and October of 1954, the CRUA (later known as the *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN)), organized a military network whose aim was to conduct a war of independence within Algeria.

The war was fought between 1954 and 1962, with the final truce in June. At the war’s end, 1.4 million refugees, including European, Algerian Jews, and pro-French Muslims, left for France. Many of the Muslim Algerians, known as Harkis, who did not escape were massacred. The 91,000 who fled to France were the final Algerian natives who began the long journey for acceptance in French society.

Abdelmalek Sayad identifies three ages of French Algerian immigration. The first one began prior to World War II and continued through the war’s completion. It was an “orderly” immigration of a peasant who was fighting for survival and who expected emigration to provide him with the means to enhance his quality of life, while allowing him to maintain his cultural self-identity.⁴⁶ The first age’s immigrants were characterized by “good behavior or the social sense of limits.” They were confined or chose to confine themselves within the refugee world, and they were not required to interact within French society in any meaningful way. They were not forced to reconcile their lifelong experiences under French Algerian rule with the French population that surrounded them. The “exile” within which these immigrants found themselves encouraged the

community to “take refuge in this sort of little country that has been reconstructed in France as an extension of the great country of his birth, and thus demonstrates his generalized refusal to become part of a world (that of immigration) which he finds decidedly foreign.”⁴⁷

The second age, which ran from the end of World War II into the Algerian war’s period of sustained violence, included immigrants who were “not only impoverished but also totally proletarianized.” Immigration offered “perhaps the only opportunity they would ever have - to fulfil (sic) ambitions that their new condition both authorized and prohibited.”⁴⁸ This age is associated with a “loss of control” because immigrants no longer could live an insular existence. These immigrants were “more integrated, at least into the condition of the working class,” and were “forced into a (relatively) closer encounter with French society.”⁴⁹ While the first age’s segregation and good behavior approach protected them from racism, the second age’s required interaction, and subsequent “social audacity” exposed them to “a sharper and more frequent experience of racism.”⁵⁰

The third age, which began after Algerian independence and continues to this day, is the consolidation of and “implantation in France of an Algerian community that is relatively autonomous from both the French society with which it exists, and the Algerian society from which it originated.”⁵¹

This historical perspective manifests itself today in segregated French ghettos within which the “formation of a veritable counter-society with its own norms, its economy (what one calls the black economy), and even its own political system”⁵² is the Algerian immigrant’s reality. French sociologist Didier Lapeyronnie goes on to state that

these immigrants “feeling ostracized by the Republic and plunged into a veritable political vacuum, have organized a counter-society which protects them even as they are disadvantaged in relation to the exterior world.”⁵³ Within Muslim neighborhoods in which “police only rarely dare to enter...residents have systemic strategies to keep police out.”⁵⁴ It is within this counter-society that Islamists find a population vulnerable to their ideological advances.

According to France’s 1958 constitution, it is illegal to gather data on ethnicity and race in France. Because it does not maintain official census data for race, ethnicity or religion, it is difficult for France to determine the actual size of its problem with disaffected citizens. Demographic data is primarily obtained by polls conducted by non-governmental organizations. Unfortunately, the numbers vary widely among the different polls. According to one source, of France’s 65.4 million residents, approximately six million are of North African Muslim descent and 1.6 million are black Africans from south of the Sahara desert.⁵⁵ France’s Interior Ministry estimated a Muslim community near five million in 2004.⁵⁶ A 2006 poll of French religious demography estimated the number of Muslims at 3.9 million, or six percent of the population.⁵⁷

More important than the raw demographics are the people’s perceptions of discrimination in critical areas. With regard to discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, France has the highest percentage of respondents (63%) who believe that discrimination in housing is either very, or fairly widespread.⁵⁸ 37% of French respondents indicated that religion or belief based discrimination is very or fairly widespread in the education system.⁵⁹ Interestingly enough, 80% of French

respondents either “very much agree” or “agree” that legislation against discrimination in these areas is needed.⁶⁰ These are but two examples. What is clear is that not only the immigrant minority population, but the population as a whole, see both a problem and a need for redress.

France is a republic whose bicameral parliament consists of a National Assembly and a Senate. The National Assembly’s deputies are charged to represent local constituencies and are elected to five year terms. A telling statistic regarding both a lack of legislative action with regard to discriminatory practices, and non-existent minority representation, is that of the 555 deputies representing districts in continental France none are black or Muslim, although 22 seats are held by minorities representing France’s overseas territories. This only exacerbates the vulnerable population’s belief that they are indeed powerless. This is but one area in which proactive French reform may save it from a possible terrorist onslaught.

The cumulative effect of France’s Algerian immigrant population’s collective disenfranchisement is not beyond repair. Following the October-November 2005 riots in several French cities, the International Crisis Group commissioned a study of France’s Muslim population. The resulting work, *France and its Muslims: Riots, Jihadism, and Depoliticisation*, provided both analysis of the problems, and offered recommendations to the French government, national political forces, and activists from the immigrant communities and underprivileged neighborhoods. The study determined that

While the general tendency is to define the problem as a clash between the communal order supposedly governing Muslims on the one hand and the emphasis on individualism allegedly governing the French republic on the other, the problem is in fact the precise opposite. France’s Muslims are in reality far more individualistic than expected...a policy response that focuses on religion building and looks for more “moderate,” controllable

Muslim representatives will have little impact. Offering young Muslims a tamer, domesticated, or co-opted Islam will hinder neither the temptation of radicalism, nor the dynamics of mass rioting. A more successful approach would focus on the political matters at the core of the crisis and concentrate on curbing repressive practices in disadvantaged neighbourhoods and promoting new, credible forms of political representation for young Muslims.⁶¹

The study found that the Muslim population's individualist concerns, tendency to retreat from French society, and to opt out of politics creates a vacuum in which a "movement which preaches rigorous adherence to scripture and focuses on morals and individual behavior, and calls for a break with Western societies,"⁶² has grown. The report contends, however, that the unrest in 2005 "took place without any religious actors, and confirmed that the Islamists do not control these neighborhoods." As a result, the report recommends an approach that focuses on critical issues aimed at addressing the political matters at the core of the crisis.⁶³

Recommendations

Even though the NSCT identifies political alienation as one of the four factors from which terrorism springs, it does not espouse a U.S. effort in the internal matters of democratic countries like France. To institutionalize the United States' strategy for long-term success, the NSCT seeks to "establish and maintain international standards of accountability, strengthen coalitions and partnerships, enhance government architecture and interagency collaboration, and foster intellectual and human capital."⁶⁴ With "partners," the NSCT states that the United States will collaborate "to update and tailor international obligations to meet the evolving nature of the terrorist enemies and threats...and ensure that each country is both willing and able to meet its counterterrorist responsibilities."⁶⁵ The United States' specific efforts are articulated as "building the capacity of foreign partners in all areas of counterterrorism activities,

including strengthening their ability to conduct law enforcement, intelligence, and military counterterrorism operations,” aimed at helping partners “attack and defeat terrorists, deny them funding and freedom of movement, secure their critical infrastructures, and deny terrorists access to WMD and safehavens.”⁶⁶ This approach, however, does not address populations that cannot yet be called terrorists, and requires revision.

There are many areas in which, with U.S. encouragement, France may choose to alter its current posture with regard to its Muslim population. It must begin with the realization of the folly in its “misperceptions of Islam as a monolithic faith whose adherents possess a universal penchant for the proliferation of radical religious fundamentalism,” and acknowledgement that the unique demonstrative characteristics of Islam “fuels such misjudgments in societies within which these types of behavior are not the norm.”⁶⁷ Drawing from its own experiences, the United States can provide an example, and assistance where desired, of means by which to affect change. All of the following suggestions come with the knowledge that France’s willingness to listen to, much less follow U.S. recommendations will take shrewd diplomacy, and likely require substantial inducements. There is a possibility that proposals will be ignored or perceived as an unwarranted encroachment into French internal affairs. This should not deter an effort because just as in the 1930s, when the United States correlated its future with the United Kingdom’s success in the fight against Nazi Germany, it may be prudent for it to do the same with its Western European allies in their conflict with Islamist ideology.

Muslim Political Involvement/Representation. In spite of its checkered colonialist past, France's desired identity is personified by its motto, "*Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité*" (Liberty, Equality, Brotherhood). It does not, where its Muslim population is concerned, appear to live up to this motto. In spite of its relatively efficient path to citizenship, its citizens of Muslim descent are not embraced in the spirit of "brotherhood." The societal divide between the Muslim and non-Muslim segments of society is exacerbated by a lack of Muslim representation within the political process. Consequently, the United States must encourage France to adopt measures that promote Muslim inclusion. The concerns expressed by Muslim political movements must be received in a constructive manner. Muslim access to France's governmental apparatus can be achieved via political appointments to cabinet positions, and ultimately access to elective political office. Muslims should be encouraged to vote, and perceived barriers to electoral involvement eradicated. Because France's naturalization policy "permits all legal residents to apply for citizenship after five years in France and every child born on French soil to apply for citizenship,"⁶⁸ the Muslim voting population will only increase. France must recognize that the Muslim electorate's inclusion in the electoral process will facilitate their "ownership" of France's legislative system and encourage constructive involvement in the system.

Effective State Presence in Underprivileged Neighborhoods. Relations between French police and Muslim communities are tenuous, at best. Cases like the 2001 police beating and strangulation of a 16 year old Muslim youth, or the electrocutions of two teens being chased by police that precipitated the 2005 riots, resonate within the Muslim population and are just a few examples. While the European Court of Human

Rights (ECHR) criticized France for allowing an environment that allows police brutality,⁶⁹ the Action Police trade union contends that the police “are in a state of civil war, orchestrated by radical Islamists. This is not a question of urban violence any more, it is an intifada, with stones and Molotov cocktails.”⁷⁰ Without effective resolution, the conflict between the police and Muslim population will only worsen. The International Crisis Group analysis determined that France must “focus on police training, including by severely punishing abuses of power, notably those with a racial connotation,”⁷¹ while also “rebuilding non-authoritarian forms of mediation between state authorities and the population, for example by revitalising neighbourhood policing and social activities.”⁷² In this regard, the United States has vast experiential resources available that can be of assistance. Urban policing policies in cities such as Los Angeles or New York have long been the subject of debate. Following the explosive Rodney King incident, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) took measures to address the problematic issues that precipitated it. It “pushed hard to reform itself and shake free of a deeply ingrained reputation among minority communities as a racist, corrupt, and at times brutal institution.”⁷³ These efforts resulted in a police force that was deemed “a kinder, gentler, reform-oriented and top crime-fighting organization,” by the head of the Los Angeles Urban Policy Roundtable. The head of the police union hailed the fact that the deputy police chief “never bought into the idea that if he supported his cops, then...he couldn't support the community. He struck that balance with incredible skill.”⁷⁴ By exporting experienced police trainers to France, the United States can provide its police forces with a new perspective from officers who have

experienced daily violence at the hands of a disenfranchised community, and found a way to work together with that community.

Integration/Assimilation. The U.S.' experience with the difficult task of integrating minority groups into the mainstream of society has been a long, arduous one. Though the term "melting pot" was coined in the early 1900s, the successful immersion of European, Asian, Hispanic and former slave populations has taken generations. For some of these groups, the integration has come only via judicial or legislative mandates which forced change. Representation via elective office, in the media, and in professional arenas has truly been manifested for all groups within the last 30 years. Assimilation, an often misunderstood term, is still a work in progress for some groups. For France to attain the status in which all of its citizens feel they have access to socio-economic equality, a concerted effort is necessary. Recently, the United Nations' Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination criticized the French government for a lack of political will in tackling mounting acts of racism, with one UN expert stating that the French "government's attitudes amounted to an 'incitement to hatred.'"⁷⁵ To this charge, the French Secretary of State for European Affairs Pierre Lellouche said that France is a state which supports "human rights; a political idea which the country had effectively invented over 200 years ago."⁷⁶ Regardless of France's role in the creation of human rights, tangible steps must be taken to address existing problems and perceptions. Potential corrective measures include promoting ethnic assimilation via revised public housing allocation, and "rigorously applying the 'Solidarity and Urban Renewal' law which is aimed at ensuring a more equal distribution of public housing among different municipalities."⁷⁷ In addition, the French government should initiate a

public campaign designed to combat religious, racial or ethnic discrimination. For assistance in this area, the United States can provide France with city planners who have practical experience in urban renewal, and anti-discriminatory laws and programs. Achieving socio-economic assimilation is an iterative process and France's efforts in this regard are stagnant. The resistance that some of the majority will mount must be met head on, rather than avoided.

Religious Interdiction. France's separation of church and state (*laïcité*) philosophy is not applied in the same manner as that of the United States. The French National Assembly's 2004 passage of a measure banning all prominent religious symbols from public schools sprang from the Stasi report's recommendations. The Stasi report "placed importance on the ability of the collective French citizenry to interact in a religiously neutral public space. Thus, secularism was presented as a unifying force in French society, and as an integral part of French national identity."⁷⁸ There is no evidence of the ban contributing to a secular assimilation between Christians, Jews, and Muslims. To the contrary, "some Islamic secondary schools were established after the law was voted, but not all Muslim families could afford the fees. Some students chose to study at home, and others migrated with their families."⁷⁹ What France should focus on is the fact that of its 1,000 to 1,500 Muslim Imams, only 10% are citizens, and less than half speak French.⁸⁰ According to Imam Abdellah Boussouf, "The majority of Imams preaching in France are self-taught or have had no formal religious education."⁸¹ Given that "only 10% of them are believed to be citizens, less than half speak French, and 'probably a majority' are illegal immigrants," their religious training is "likely to be in fundamentalist Islamist views that clash with secular French laws."⁸² While Boussouf

acknowledges that the Muslim community must take responsibility for properly training Imams, he also feels that the state must be involved as well. He stated that “little would be achieved without state aid - which could contravene France's strict laws on the separation of church and state.”⁸³ The United States could potentially provide the aid that Boussouf requests. In coordination with the French government, as an outside entity, the U.S. government could facilitate such financial support, so that the French government does not violate its legal code. While The International Crisis Group warns that France must “abandon the idea that institutionalising Islam as a religion will thwart the jihadist temptation,”⁸⁴ this does not mean that France should turn a blind eye to the threat that untrained Imams provide.

Conclusion

The NSCT’s strategy seeks to advance democracy over the long term, and in the short term it focuses on: preventing attacks by terrorist networks; denying WMD to rogue states and terrorist allies who seek to use them; denying terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states; denying terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and launching pad for terror; and laying the foundations and building the institutions and structures needed to carry the fight forward. Its long term approach for winning the War on Terror and the manner in which it has been executed, however, limits its efficacy.

In order to effectively stem the flow of new recruits into the Jihadist fold, the U.S. government must codify, within the NSCT, measures aimed at addressing the concept that “organizational recruitment and bottom-up socialization processes are critical to the radicalization process,”⁸⁵ and that vulnerable Muslim populations in allied democratic

nations must be targeted. Via U.S. elements of national power, U.S. allies must therefore be compelled to take actions that reduce or eradicate the factors that make these populations vulnerable. Given that “alienation helps feed collective grievances and enhances the allure of radical milieus...strides should be taken to integrate Muslim populations who otherwise reside in separated diaspora communities.”⁸⁶ France’s Algerian population is one such community. Within this community, the social dynamics of conformity, compliance, group think, group polarization, diffusion of responsibility, and in-group/out-group can incubate vulnerability to jihadism and warrants a comprehensive counter-recruitment strategy.

Given that European “home grown” terrorists may one day again participate in attacks on U.S. soil, the NSCT’s focus must expand to include a more proactive involvement on the European continent. By articulating this assessment with European allies such as France, and following up with a clearly defined and resourced effort, the United States can enhance its own security by influencing allied domestic strategies. In France, a strategy designed to marginalize the Jihadist message should include increased Muslim political involvement/representation, a more effective state presence in underprivileged neighborhoods, improved integration/assimilation efforts, and religious interdiction. The United States’ progress in addressing each of these issues domestically, combined with its ability to provide France with training and economic resources, make it uniquely suited to provide assistance.

Because the United States may encounter difficulty in securing French cooperation, in addition to quid pro quo inducements, it must also leverage allies like Great Britain as it engages French leadership. At the 2010 UK-France summit, French

President Nicolas Sarkozy commented, “If you my British friends, had to face a major crisis, could you imagine France simply sitting there, its arms crossed and saying, ‘this is none of our business’?”⁸⁷ If the United States, via an assortment of efforts, can establish a similar relationship with Sarkozy, and subsequently other European nations’ leaders, then efforts to expand the NSCT’s breadth and viability are indeed possible. In doing so, the United States will continue to enhance its security with regard to the terrorist threat.

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⁵⁵ Kieth B. Richburg, "Europe's Minority Politicians in short supply," April 2005, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A12396-2005Apr23.html> (accessed January 13, 2011).

⁵⁶ John Henley, "France to Train Imams in 'French Islam'," April 23, 2004, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/apr/23/france.islam.april.23> (accessed December 15, 2010).

⁵⁷ La Documentation Francaise, "Panorama Religieux de la France," 2006, <http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/dossiers/religions-france/panorama-religieux.shtml> (accessed December 5, 2010).

⁵⁸ European Commission, *Discrimination in the European Union: Perceptions and experience of discrimination in the areas of housing, healthcare, education, and when buying products or using services*, 2006, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_232_en.pdf (accessed January 20, 2011).

⁵⁹ Ibid., 25.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 57, 59.

⁶¹ International Crisis Group, *France and its Muslims: Riots, Jihadism, and Depoliticisation*, 2006, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/172-france-and-its-muslims-riots-jihadism-and-depoliticisation.aspx> (accessed January 30, 2011).

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ The report recommends four primary means by which the French government should address these issues:

1. Reduce the state's coercive presence in underprivileged neighbourhoods by:

(a) Focusing on police training, including by severely punishing abuses of power, notably those with a racial connotation; and

(b) Rebuilding non-authoritarian forms of mediation between state authorities and the population, for example by revitalising neighbourhood policing and social activities.

2. Reduce social discrimination by, in particular:

(a) Revising public housing allocation by promoting ethnic intermixing;

(b) Rigorously applying the “Solidarity and Urban Renewal” law which is aimed at ensuring a more equal distribution of public housing among different municipalities; and

(c) Conducting vigorous and sustained public campaigns against racial and ethnic discrimination.

3. Reform the modes of political representation of the Muslim population, and in particular:

(a) Abandon the idea that institutionalising Islam as a religion will thwart the jihadist temptation;

(b) Clearly define the functions of the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman as a body charged with the management of the faith, not with the representation of Muslims residing in France;

(c) Curb policies of a clientelist and communal character at all levels of the state;

(d) Give priority, in dialogue with young Muslims at both the local and regional levels, to those who have been born in France; and

(e) Adopt a constructive attitude in relation to those political movements that might grow out of the October-November riots.

4. Revitalise the associational movement, in particular:

(a) Review the harsh cuts that have affected the public financing of associations since 2002 and do not neglect those associations with clear political goals;

(b) Adopt a long-term approach to funding; and

(c) Better oversee and control how these funds are used.

⁶⁴ U.S. Government, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, 19.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Robert J. Pauly Jr., *Islam in Europe: Integration or Marginalization* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004), 33.

⁶⁸ Michel Gurfinkiel, *Islam in France: The French Way of Life Is In Danger*, The Middle East Quarterly, March, 1997, <http://www.meforum.org/337/islam-in-france-the-french-way-of-life-is-in> (accessed February 13, 2011).

⁶⁹ Press TV, “France ‘Too Lenient on Police Brutality’,” November 4, 2010, <http://www.presstv.ir/detail/149661.html> (accessed February 10, 2011).

⁷⁰ David Rennie, "Muslims are Waging Civil War Against Us, Claims Police Union," October 5, 2006, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1530659/Muslims-are-waging-civil-war-against-us-claims-police-union.html> (accessed February 20, 2011).

⁷¹ International Crisis Group, *France and its Muslims*.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Joel Rubin, "Kenneth Otto Garner Dies at 53; LAPD Deputy Chief Improved Minority Relations, Helped Diversify Police Department," *Los Angeles Times*. March 2, 2009, <http://articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/02/local/me-kenneth-garner2> (accessed February 18, 2011).

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ The Connexion, *UN Slams French Prejudice*, August 13, 2010, <http://www.connexionfrance.com/UN-criticism-racism-prejudice-France-11914-view-article.html> (accessed February 13, 2011).

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ International Crisis Group, *France and its Muslims*.

⁷⁸ Elizabeth Hope Bordeaux, *Un-Veiling Islamophobia in the Post-9/11 Era: Orientalism in the Veil Debate in France and the United States*, 2007, http://cgi.unc.edu/uploads/media_items/un-veiling-islamophobia-in-the-post-9-11-era-orientalism-in-the-veil-debate-in-france-and-the-united-states-december-2003-to-june-2004.original.pdf (accessed February 21, 2011).

⁷⁹ Amara Bamba, *French Anti-Hijab Law: Four Years On*, April 12, 2008, http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1203758927834&pagename=Zone-English-Euro_Muslims%2FEMELayout (accessed February 21, 2011).

⁸⁰ John Henley, "France to Train Imams in 'French Islam'."

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ International Crisis Group, *France and its Muslims*.

⁸⁵ Paul K. Davis, Kim Cragin, *Social Science for Counterterrorism*, 98.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ AUSA Institute of Land Warfare Defense Report, *The French-British Defense Treaty: Setting History Aside* (Arlington, VA: AUSA, January, 2011), 2.

